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Justice Ginsburg and the New Legal Process
John F. Manning
Bruce Bromley Professor of Law
J
ustice Ginsburg exemplifies the New Legal Process style of interpre-
tation. The old Legal Process course—which Justice Ginsburg (and 
three of her current colleagues) took in law school—taught us three ba-
sic things. First, “[t]he idea of a statute without an intelligible purpose 
is foreign to the idea of law and inadmissible.” Second, in our constitu-
tional system, interpreters must “[r]espect the position of the legislature 
as the chief policy-determining agency of the society, subject only to the 
limitations of the Constitution.”4 Third, it follows that judges faced with 
a statutory question should ask “what purpose ought to be attributed to 
the statute” and then “[i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately in 
question so as to carry out its purpose as best it can.”5
  All of this made good sense—so much so that the Legal Process school 
effortlessly dominated post-New Deal thinking about statutes for genera-
tions.6 But embedded in this purposive philosophy was a tension. With 
no acknowledgment of the contradiction, the Legal Process materials 
developed by Harvard Professors Hart and Sacks presented two conflict-
ing techniques for effectuating statutory purpose. Option A said that in 
ascertaining purpose, interpreters must ultimately respect the text: “The 
words of the statute are what the legislature has enacted as law, and all 
that it has the power to enact.”7 So, whatever else they do, judges must 
not “give the words . . . a meaning they will not bear.”8 Option B seemed 
to assume that if the text did not capture the law’s true purpose, the 
former must yield: “The meaning of words can almost always be nar- “The meaning of words can almost always be nar-
rowed if the context seems to call for the narrowing.”9 And judges could 
legitimately extend statutes to situations “seemingly within [a statute’s] 44
purpose but not within any accepted meaning of its words.”0
  Though Hart and Sacks were apparently of two minds about the text, 
the post-New Deal Court was not. It took Option B. Because laws are 
complex and legislators are human, judges might have to go beyond the 
text to get at what legislators really meant to achieve. In searching for 
this legislative purpose, nothing was out of bounds. As the Court unani-
mously wrote in United States v. American Trucking Associations:
  [W]hen the plain meaning . . . produce[s] . . . an unreasonable [re-
sult] plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole this 
Court . . . follow[s] that purpose, rather than the literal words. When 
aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is 
available, there certainly can be no rule of law which forbids its use, 
however clear the words may appear on superficial examination.
  In the five decades after American Trucking, the Court did not hesitate 
to reshape a statute’s text to reflect the background intentions or purposes 
that the Justices perceived in the statements of pivotal legislators or the 
telling changes made to successive drafts of a bill.
  The Court, however, now takes a different approach. I am not refer-
ring to textualism, which would exclude all legislative history on the 
ground that it is unenacted, unrepresentative, and thus illegitimate per 
se. Whatever the merits or demerits of that position, it has not captured 
the Court’s center. Instead, the consensus now seems to have clustered 
around Hart and Sacks’s Option A. The new approach, like the old, still 
considers anything that might cast light on a statute’s objectives—includ-
ing its legislative history. What’s new is this: The semantic meaning of the 
enacted text, when clear, now sets a hard cap on the judge’s discretion. 
Justice Ginsburg is at the epicenter of this New Legal Process approach.
  Consider her opinion for the Court in Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. 
v. Nigh.4 As is true of many classic statutory opinions, Nigh does not 
involve a headline-grabbing issue. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) re-
quires creditors to disclose to consumers certain information pertaining 
to interest rates, finance charges, and the rights of borrowers.5 Because 
actual damages from nondisclosure may be difficult to prove, TILA 45
accomplishes its remedial purposes through specific formulae that assess 
“statutory” damages based on the kind of transaction.6 Prior to 995, the 
key provision—5 U.S.C. § 640(a)—prescribed the following formulate 
for statutory damages:
 ()(A)(i) in the case of an individual action, twice the amount of any 
finance charge in connection with the transaction, or (ii) in the case of 
an individual action relating to a consumer lease . . . 5 per centum of 
the total amount of monthly payments under the lease, except that the 
liability under this subparagraph shall not be less than $00 nor greater 
than $,000. . . .7
  That is, where a lender or lessor failed to make the required TILA 
disclosures, § 640(a)()(A) called for statutory damages equal to twice 
the amount of the finance charge (in the case of consumer credit) or 
one- quarter of a monthly payment (in the case of a consumer lease). As 
the lower courts uniformly held, the final clause—the $00/$,000 pro-
viso—set a floor and a ceiling for the amounts that could be recovered 
under either of the specified transactions—loans or leases.8
  Nigh arose out of a 995 amendment that added yet another provi-
sion—one setting higher limits for statutory damages arising out of cer-
tain loans secured by real property—namely, closed-end credit requiring 
repayment at a fixed time, as opposed to revolving lines of credit.9 Con-
gress inserted this proviso as a new clause (iii) at the end of the existing 
provision, which then read as follows:
 ()(A)(i) in the case of an individual action, twice the amount of any 
finance charge in connection with the transaction, (ii) in the case of an 
individual action relating to a consumer lease . . . 5 per centum of the 
total amount of monthly payments under the lease, except that the li-
ability under this subparagraph shall not be less than $00 nor greater 
than $,000, or (iii) in the case of an individual action relating to a credit 
transaction not under an open-end credit plan that is secured by real 
property or a dwelling, not less than $00 or greater than $,000. . . .0
  Nigh alleged that Koons Buick had failed to make required TILA 
disclosures in an auto financing transaction and that, after the 995 46
amendment, the $00/$,000 proviso no longer applied to the routine 
credit transactions governed by clause (i). Why? Based on the post-
amendment structure of § 640(a)()(A), the $00/$,000 proviso seemed 
logically to apply only to clause (ii)—the one governing consumer leases. 
Again, the proviso states that the $00/$,000 limitation governs “the lia-
bility under this subparagraph.” But once Congress added clause (iii), one 
could no longer comfortably read “this subparagraph” to mean § 640(a)
()(A) as a whole; to do so would be to apply the $00/$,000 proviso to 
the subset of transactions that § 640(a)()(A)(iii) now subjected to the 
new $00/$,000 proviso. Nor would it make structural sense to read 
“this subparagraph” to refer to both § 640(a)()(A)(i) and (ii), as Koons 
Buick urged. If one were to read “subparagraph” to refer to the statutory 
subdivisions marked off by Roman numerals, then the phrase “under 
this subparagraph” would presumably refer only to the Roman numeral 
subdivision in which the proviso actually appeared—that is, § 640(a)()
(A)(ii) and its damages rule for consumer leases.
  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court, however, did not reach that con-
clusion. Rather, she reasoned that restricting the $00/$,000 proviso to 
consumer leases would go beyond the evident purposes of the 995 amend-
ment. Prior to 995, as noted, § 640(a)()(A) applied that proviso to all 
credit transactions. And Justice Ginsburg found it most unlikely that by 
inserting a $00/$,000 proviso for a subset of transactions secured by real 
property, Congress intended to uncap entirely the statutory damages for 
all other credit transactions. Nothing in the legislative history of the 995 
amendment suggested that Congress meant to perform such radical surgery 
on the statutory damages scheme in such an indirect way. Nor could the 
Court see any apparent policy justification for Congress to impose a $,000 
cap on damages for a subset of secured credit transactions—but no cap at all 
for other kinds of credit. Reading the statute in light of its drafting history 
and a common-sense assessment of legislative policy, Justice Ginsburg held 
that the specific $00/$,000 proviso applied only to transactions specified 
by clause (iii), while the more general $00/$,000 proviso reached all other 
transactions encompassed within subparagraph ()(A).47
  So Justice Ginsburg relied heavily on statutory purpose. But in contrast 
with the Old Legal Process approach that once prevailed, her approach 
did not treat purpose as a free-standing concept. Rather, she deemed it 
necessary first to ensure that the statute’s semantic meaning could bear 
the meaning ascribed to it by the Court. How did she do this? She asked 
whether “subparagraph” was a term of art. It turns out that it is. In a 
world in which a statutory provision can have as many tiers as § 640(a)
()(A)(ii), the legislative drafting community has developed uniform 
conventions for identifying each tier:
  “To the maximum extent practicable, a section should be broken into-
  (A) subsections (starting with [a]);
  (B) paragraphs (starting with []);
  (C) subparagraphs (starting with [A]);
  (D) clauses (starting with [i])  . . .”
  Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg could say that semantic convention, 
as well as evident statutory purpose, supported her conclusion that the 
phrase “this subparagraph” in the $00/$,000 proviso reached every 
part of § 640(a)()(A) . . . except the one to which the more specific 
$00/$,000 proviso explicitly applied.
  This put Justice Ginsburg smack in the Court’s center, with a majority of 
her colleagues. In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that if one read the provi-
sion cold, one would not expect to find “a purportedly universal [proviso] 
at the end of the second item in a three-item list.”4 Since the text would 
be clear to an ordinary reader, the drafting history just did not come into 
play. In a concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, lamented 
the Court’s new tendency to consult extrinsic evidence of legislative intent 
or purpose only where semantic meaning permitted.5 For them, it seemed 
“wiser to acknowledge that it is always appropriate to consider all available 
evidence of Congress’s true intent when interpreting its work product.”6 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion walked a line between the two.
  Though I have written much about the virtues of textualism, I find a 
great deal to admire in the middle course taken by Justice Ginsburg and 
the New Legal Process. It seems to me that she was quite right to think that 48
Congress would not have made such a radical change in such an indirect 
way. Her sensitivity to Congress’s evident purpose made sense of the likely 
legislative outcome and deftly avoided a result that seems quite evidently 
to have been the product of awkward drafting. At the same time, by con-
sidering those factors only after verifying that the text allowed it, Justice 
Ginsburg welded her purposivism to the idea of legislative supremacy that 
our constitutional order has long embraced. Congress acts purposively but 
does not express its purposes in the abstract. Through the rules it embeds 
in the statutory text, Congress tells us how far the majority wishes to go 
in pursuit of its purposes and what it is willing to pay to achieve them. As 
the Court wrote in an opinion that marked the beginning of its shift from 
the Old to the New Legal Process approach:
  Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague 
social or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ sharply 
on the means for effectuating that intent, the final language of the leg-
islation may reflect hard-fought compromises. Invocation of the “plain 
purpose” of legislation at the expense of the terms of the statute itself 
takes no account of the processes of compromise. . . .7
  Justice Ginsburg’s statutory jurisprudence—nicely typified by Koons 
Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh—reflects that reality. Congress legislates 
to make policy, and a judge who wishes to show fidelity to Congress must 
take policy into account . . . but only to the extent that a statute allows. 
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